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The OCR Glossary

Collective Intentionality

Christopher W. J. Steele

People often ascribe intentionality to collective actors, such as nations, corporations, and groups. Implicitly or explicitly, they assume that these actors have their own interests, dispositions, and habits, as well as their own distinctive orientations toward the world. A large body of social theory and research justifies this approach. Over time, collectives do develop typical ways of doing things, which shape the cognition and behavior of their memberships. This intentionality of a collective (i.e., its orientation to action or character) can play an important role in shaping its external reputations. In turn, such reputations influence the future character of the collective by making its members proud and inclined to maintain its character, for example, or by making them ashamed and keen to change it. The remainder of this entry addresses perspectives on the emergence and operation of collective intentionality and the relationship between collective intentionality and collective reputation.

There are three main perspectives on collective intentionality within the social sciences (though the concept is often implicit). These perspectives may be seen as competing or complementary. The first perspective stresses the role of organizational structure. In many organizations, explicit incentive systems are designed to reward members when they further the goals of the collective, and to penalize them when they work against collective interests. In other collectives, these incentive systems emerge more informally, as members gain good reputations for dedication to the collective, for example, and poor ones for acting solely in self-interest. In each case, the collective begins to shape the behaviors of its membership and gain a characteristic way of acting in the world. Formal and informal routines also play an important role. As they act together, the members of a collective begin to develop shared routines or have routines imposed on them. These routines provide guidance regarding how the members should act, or even how they should think, thus helping to imbue the collective with a distinctive character.

A second perspective on intentionality stresses the power of culture. As the members of a collective interact, they can develop a sense of shared values and beliefs. These in turn help inform their behavior, as they try to put their values into practice. Over time, individual members’ beliefs are bolstered by the support of other members; new members are selected, in part because of their support for existing collective beliefs and values. As a result, a distinctive organizational culture—and character—becomes entrenched within the collective. A similar effect can arise when members begin to derive a sense of pride and self-worth from their membership of a given collective. In such circumstances, members will often seek to further the aims of the collective, because to do so is to directly enhance the value of their own identity.

A third perspective, less well established than the others, focuses on the role of collectives as quasi-independent actors. As the members of a collective act on its behalf, their actions can help outsiders and other members evaluate how the collective as a whole will act and react in the future. People begin to take this collective style into account in their own plans and activities, assessing the collective’s likely actions, or even its current state of mind, in the same way that they might assess those of a colleague or acquaintance. The members of the collective begin to see the organization as an actor in its own right—an actor whose interests they should take into account, even when in conflict with their own. Collective intentionality is thus achieved because the organization enters into the members’ decision making as an omnipresent, influential other, with its own distinct identity—an identity defining who it is, rather than who its members are. In addition, the organization begins to gain external reputations of its own, for being trustworthy or untrustworthy, for example, or staid or creative.

However it emerges, the intentionality of collective actors can play an important role in shaping the reputations of collectives among outsiders. External audiences develop expectations about the future actions and reactions of collectives, inferring their character and orientation to action from the past actions and statements of their members. These assessments of collective character may be pragmatic (e.g., “Is this an organization we would like to work with?”), morally laden (e.g., “Is this an ethical organization?”), or both. Such assessments of character can be a key component of external reputations, though other factors also play an important role. In turn, these reputations feed back into collective intentionality and character. Members of a collective may find their sense of worth bolstered or challenged by the external reputations of the collective as a whole. As a result, they may seek to maintain, reinforce, or transform the character of their collective through intervention in its structure, culture, and ultimately its identity.

The concept of collective intentionality has long had a central role in the social sciences, and it has recently become more explicit, perhaps due, in part, to the increasing weight it is being given in philosophy and in theories of cognition. At present, the scope remaining to be researched is substantial regarding how various sources and forms of collective intentionality interact as well as when collective character is more or less central to external reputation.

Rai, T. S., & Diermeier, D. (2015). Corporations are cyborgs: Organizations elicit anger but not sympathy when they can think but cannot feel. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 126, 18–26.

Steele, C. W. J., & King, B. G. (2011). Collective intentionality in organizations: A meta-ethnography of identity and strategizing. In S. R. Thye & E. J. Lawler (Eds.), Advances in group processes (Vol. 28, pp. 59–95). Bingley, UK: Emerald Group.

Tollefsen, D. P. (2002). Collective intentionality and the social sciences. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 32(1), 25–50.

See Also

Actor-Network Theory; Corporate Identity; Organizational Character; Organizational Culture; Organizational Identity; Reputational Dynamics

See Also

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